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Introduction and summary
On March 5, 2001, the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago first released publicly the Chicago Fed Na-
tional Activity Index (CFNAI), a single, summary
measure of real economic activity that is based on a
weighted average of 85 economic indicators. This in-
augural CFNAI release explicitly mentioned the pos-
sibility that the U.S. economy had begun to slip into
a recession. On November 26, 2001, the National
Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER) Business
Cycle Dating Committee “determined that a peak in
business activity had in fact occurred in the U.S. econ-
omy in March 2001 (NBER, 2001).” As the eight-
months lag of the NBER report indicates, business
cycle turning points are typically only recognized many
months after the event; thus, the ability of the CFNAI
to identify the recession in approximately real time is
important—since early recognition of business cycle
turning points will enable more timely monetary pol-
icy responses.
Although one of the first uses of the CFNAI was
to gauge inflationary pressures (Fisher, 2000), there
is a strong statistical relationship between this index
of economic activity and business cycle movements.
We can see this in figure 1, which displays the three-
month moving average index (CFNAI-MA3) from
1986 through 2001. Whenever the three-month mov-
ing average of this index falls into the range of –0.70
to –1.00, there is an increasing probability that the U.S.
economy is in a recession. The substantial fall in the
index to –1.50 in late 1990 corresponds to the 1990–91
recession. Similarly, the 2001 recession (see figures 2
and 3) is clearly evident as the index fell below –1.00.
Prior to the current recession, there were five reces-
sions over the 1967–2000 period. In six cases, the
CFNAI-MA3 fell below –0.70, after having previous-
ly been above zero when the economy was expanding.
On five of these occasions, the U.S. economy had
just entered a recession as determined later by the
NBER. Taken at face value, this is an 83 percent suc-
cess rate for the CFNAI.
To further our understanding of the CFNAI and
its role as a business cycle indicator, we address two
main questions in this article. First, what is the general
relationship between the CFNAI and economic reces-
sions? While economic downturns are clearly evident
in the sharp reductions in the CFNAI, how much more
information do we gain beyond what we would learn
by simply focusing on single indicator measures of
economic activity like industrial production, personal
consumption expenditures, and others? We offer a
graphical analysis of the data to answer this question.
Second, what probabilistic statements about economic
performance can we attach to specific values of the
CFNAI-MA3? When the CFNAI-MA3 plunges to val-
ues below –0.70, what is the probability that the U.S.
economy has entered a recession? We adopt a statistical
approach to modeling the dynamic evolution of the 85
economic indicators in order to answer this question.
To summarize our findings, our graphical analy-
sis indicates that individual economic indicators ap-
pear to predict the onset of economic recessions almost
as well as the CFNAI-MA3. Indeed, many business
cycle analysts prefer a relatively small number of eco-
nomic indicators to guide their analysis. For example,
the NBER November 2001 committee report makes
clear the importance of four monthly coincident eco-
nomic indicators of real activity: payroll employment,
industrial production, real personal income less27 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
transfer payments, and manufacturing and trade sales
in real terms.1 However, while all of the economic in-
dicators were signaling that the real economy was
growing well below trend throughout this period, they
conveyed different information about the timing of the
business cycle peak. Essentially, the NBER selected
the business peak based upon a peak in one very im-
portant indicator, total payroll employment. Visual
inspection of the co-movements between industrial
production, employment, and the CFNAI-MA3 sug-
gests that perhaps the gain in computing the index of
85 indicators is fairly small.
However, the small number of economic reces-
sions since 1967 makes this assessment misleading.
Using Monte Carlo simulations, a more careful eval-
uation of the statistical properties suggests substantial
improvements from using the CFNAI-MA3 over in-
dividual indicators. For example, when the CFNAI-MA3
falls to –0.70, the probability that the economy has
entered a recession is around 70 percent. When simi-
larly normalized three-month moving average index-
es of industrial production and personal consumption
expenditures fall below –0.70, the probabilities are
50 percent and 35 percent, respectively. This quanti-
tative analysis indicates that the CFNAI-MA3 is use-
ful for detecting the onset of economic recessions.
In the following sections, we explain the develop-
ment and construction of the CFNAI. Then, we exam-
ine how quickly and how well the index has historically
identified business cycle turning points. We examine
whether it is possible to accurately reflect the economy
with fewer indicators or whether more than 85 indi-
cators may be necessary to average out the idiosyn-
cratic noise from the underlying economic signals.
Finally, we use a statistical technique, Monte Carlo
simulations, to analyze the index’s performance. This
statistical approach provides us with a far greater num-
ber of observations than the five recessions that have
actually occurred since 1967. In particular, we focus
on the index’s ability to correctly identify the onset
of recession in the simulated economy.
Origins of the CFNAI
The Chicago Fed National Activity Index is based
upon an index designed by James Stock and Mark
Watson in their Journal of Monetary Economics article
on “Forecasting Inflation” (Stock and Watson, 1999a).
Stock and Watson’s Activity Index summarizes the
information of 85 data series in a single index value.
This is accomplished using the well-known method
of principal component analysis (see box 1 for an ex-
planation). The current version of the CFNAI attempts
to implement their monthly data selections as closely
as possible in real time. The CFNAI is the first prin-
cipal component of these data series, accounting for
the largest independent variation among the econom-
ic indicators in the data set. Equivalently, the CFNAI
is a weighted average of the 85 economic indicators.
For example, a principal component index y based on
three series can be expressed as yt = w1 ×  x1t + w2 ×
x2t + w3 × x3t, where x1, x2, and x3 are the three original
series, and w1, w2, and w3 are the weights assigned to
the data series. In practice, the weights measure the
relative importance of each series in the index.
An index like the CFNAI can be used in several
ways. One approach is to use the index as an explan-
atory variable in estimating linear relationships. By
computing a single index value for a large data set, the
gains from data reduction allow the analyst to specify
parsimonious forecasting relationships. This approach
has been used by Stock and Watson (1999a, 1999b),
Fisher, Liu, and Zhou (2002), and Bernanke and Boivin
(2002). Another approach is to use the index to iden-
tify non-linear regime switches. For example, Fisher
(2000) describes how movements in the activity in-
dex relate to broad accelerations in inflation during
certain time periods. In this article, we focus on non-
linear regime switches from economic expansions to
recessions, as in Hamilton (1989) and Diebold and
Rudebusch (1996).
Constructing the CFNAI
One of Stock and Watson’s (1999a) findings is
that the first principal component of our 85-variable
dataset captures aggregate real activity in the United
States. When we double the dataset by including var-











Note: Shaded areas indicate NBER recessions.28 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
BOX 1
Construction of the CFNAI
Data transformations and the principal
components method
The CFNAI is the first principal component of a
dataset consisting of 85 economic indicators. Back-
ground on the method of principal components may
be found in most advanced statistics and economet-
rics books. Henri Theil’s (1971) classic text Princi-
ples of Econometrics provides an excellent overview
of this method; we use Theil’s exposition and nota-
tion in the following discussion.
Let xt denote the 1 x 85 row vector consisting of
observations at time t of the 85 data series. Let XT denote














! where T is the total number of observations.
By this construction, each column of XT contains T
observations of an individual economic indicator.
Each of the 85 raw series used to compute the
CFNAI has already been inflation adjusted and, if
necessary, seasonally adjusted by the original data
provider. After obtaining these raw data series from
HaverAnalytics, we first assess each series for its
stationarity properties. If a series is determined to be
non-stationary, we apply an appropriate transforma-
tion to render the series stationary. In most instanc-
es, the data are log-differenced so that the indicator
series are transformed into growth rates. This is the
case, for example, with employment and industrial
production data. In some cases, such as the Institute
for Supply Management’s Purchasing Managers In-
dexes, the data require no transformation.
Second, each stationary series is adjusted for
outlying observations. We define an outlier to be an
observation whose distance away from the median is
greater than six times the interquartile range of the
series. That is, xit—the observation at time t of series
 i—is an outlier if 
50 75 25 6( ), it i i i xx x x −> −  where
25 50 75 ,, a n d ii i xx x are the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles
of series xi. An outlier that is above the median has
its original value replaced with 
50 75 25 6( ) ii i xx x +− ,
while an outlier that is below the median has its origi-
nal value replaced with 
50 75 25 6( ). ii i xx x −−
Finally, we rescale each series to have a mean of
zero and standard deviation of one. These standardized
series are the indicator series used in XT for the prin-
cipal component calculation.
In general, a principal component of XT is deter-
mined by a specific eigenvalue of the second-moment
matrix  XT′XT. Computing the first principal component
of XT requires calculating the eigenvector associated
with the largest eigenvalue of XT′XT. Consequently,
since the CFNAI is the first principal component of
XT, it is simply a particular weighted average of the
85 economic indicators. In particular, CFNAIt = xta,
where a is an 85 x 1 vector of weights. Although the
weights in the vector a correspond to the elements
of the eigenvector associated with the largest eigen-
value of XT′XT , the vector a is re-scaled such the re-
sulting CFNAI has a mean of zero and standard
deviation of one. Since we estimate a single set of
weights over the entire sample period, this vector of
weights remains fixed for a given set of data XT.
Revisions to the CFNAI
There are two main sources of revisions in the
CFNAI. Firstly, because the CFNAI is designed to be
released in a timely way and because indicator data are
released at different times, not all of the indicators
are available in time for a particular month’s CFNAI
release. For example, employment data are usually
available within one week of a month’s end, but in-
flation-adjusted retail inventory data are typically
not available until another five weeks have elapsed.
For any given CFNAI release in 2001, approxi-
mately one-third of the indicators will have had their
latest monthly values forecast. In other words, the re-
ported CFNAI is based on the latest observed values
for two-thirds of the 85 series and based on forecast
values for the remaining one-third. In the following
month’s CFNAI release, the data for the “lagging” series
will have become available, and the previous month’s
CFNAI value will be revised based on this data. In this
way, forecast error is a source of revision in the CFNAI.
Secondly, throughout the calendar year, the 85
monthly series are systematically revised by the origi-
nal reporting institutions. These revisions will alter the
underlying monthly data, resulting in a change in the
value of CFNAI. Although both sources of revision
will also result in a change in the weighting vector a,
we expect this and the re-normalization of the under-
lying data to have a negligible effect on the index.
rates, commodity prices, and equities, the first princi-
pal component is essentially unchanged. That is, a
measure of real activity continues to account for the
largest independent, common variation in each of the
data series. So using 166 indicators rather than our
85 would lead to negligible changes in our threshold
analysis below. Consequently, we focus on real eco-
nomic indicators in computing our index.29 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
The CFNAI is constructed from 85 coincident
economic series that are drawn from five categories
of economic activity. Table A3 in the appendix lists
all 85 series. The five categories are:
1. Production and income—These data include in-
dustrial production growth for several industries
and product classifications; component indexes
from the Institute for Supply Management’s (ISM)
Purchasing Managers Index (PMI); capacity utili-
zation measures; and real income growth mea-
sures (21 series).
2. Employment, unemployment, and labor hours—
These data include employment growth rates for
several industries from the Payroll Survey; the
employment component of the PMI; changes in
unemployment rates for several demographic
groups from the Household Survey; initial claims
for state unemployment insurance; growth rates
of production hours; and changes in help-wanted
measures (24 series).
3. Personal consumption and housing—These data
include the growth rate of real personal consump-
tion expenditures for several categories; housing
starts nationally and by region; building permits
for new housing units; and shipments of mobile
homes (13 series).
4. Manufacturing and trade sales—These data include
growth rates of real sales measures for manufac-
turing industries; several categories of wholesale
trade sales; and several categories of retail trade
sales (11 series).
5. Inventories and orders—These data include com-
ponents of the PMI related to new orders and ven-
dor performance; the growth rate of inventories
and inventory–sales ratios by manufacturing and
trade categories; and the growth rate of new or-
ders for durable goods manufacturing and nonde-
fense capital goods (16 series).
Prior to constructing the activity index, the indi-
vidual data series are transformed to be stationary as
denoted in table A3. In practice, this means that trend-
ing variables are often measured as growth rates, while
variables without trends are often left untransformed.
These transformed data are then each de-meaned and
standardized to have a unit variance. We then com-
pute the CFNAI as the first principal component of
the 85 data series. Box 1 presents the formal details
of the methodology used to construct the index.
Basic properties of the CFNAI
Figure 2 displays the monthly CFNAI from 1967
through 2001. By construction, the monthly index
has an average value of zero and a standard deviation
of one. Since many data series are deviations of
growth rates from their sample average, the monthly
index can be interpreted as the deviation of national
activity growth from its trend rate. Consequently, an
index value of zero is associated with trend rates of
growth. Another reaction to figure 2 is that the index
is quite volatile from month to month. Although in-
dex values above zero tend to stay above zero for a
period of time, there are many reversals of sharp spikes
from month to month. The monthly index, therefore,
appears to track broad movements in the economy,
but contains transitory noise. Consequently, taking a
moving average of the monthly series would average
out the transient noise while leaving the underlying
signal in place.
Figure 3 displays the trailing three-month moving
average of the monthly index. We refer to this moving
average as the CFNAI-MA3. Clearly, much of the
transient noise in the monthly index has been filtered
out. Now it is easier to see the persistent movements
of the index over time. Since the index is a weighted
average of 85 economic indicators, movements in each
of the components contribute to movements in the
CFNAI-MA3. Large positive or negative index values
tend to arise when most of the individual indicators
are moving together. This is especially evident during
periods of economic contraction. In figure 3, sharply
negative values of the CFNAI-MA3 correspond to of-
ficial NBER recessions. From 1967 through 2000, the
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previously been above zero on six occasions, and
five of those were associated with recession.
Perhaps it should not be surprising that a basket
of economic indicators can provide a useful guide to
the state of aggregate economic activity. In financial
markets, individual stock prices reflect both market
and company-specific risk. A portfolio of stocks, like
the Standard & Poor’s 500, provides diversification
of the idiosyncratic risks for individual stocks, leaving
in place the undiversifiable market risk. Movements
in the stock index provide indications of how the
stock market is evolving. Similarly, the CFNAI-MA3
is a portfolio of economic indicators. Thus, movements
in the CFNAI-MA3 are reflective of how the econo-
my is evolving. Over the period 1967 to 2000, the
CFNAI-MA3 fell substantially whenever the U.S.
economy was in a recession.
Identifying business cycle turning points
with the CFNAI
The construction of the CFNAI highlights its prop-
erties as a coincident indicator of economic expansions
and contractions. There are many ways to evaluate an
indicator. Fisher, Liu, and Zhou (2002) examine how
the CFNAI contributes to the out-of-sample explana-
tory power in linear models for forecasting inflation
over the last 15 years. In this article, we focus on how
quickly and how well the CFNAI aids in identifying
business cycle turning points. Applying a simple thresh-
old criterion, we examine how accurately the histori-
cally constructed CFNAI would have identified past
recessions and recoveries.
Identifying recessions
During the period 1967–2000, there were five
economic recessions, as identified by the NBER;
these occurred in 1970, 1973–75, 1980, 1981–82,
and 1990–91.2 Figure 3 shows the movements in the
CFNAI-MA3 in the context of the NBER recession
episodes, which are the shaded regions. As we men-
tioned earlier, figure 3 suggests that the CFNAI-MA3
may be a useful guide for identifying whether the
economy has slipped into and out of a recession. Spe-
cifically, note that, in each of the five recessions, the
smoothed CFNAI-MA3 fell below –0.70 (the dashed
negative horizontal line) very near the onset of the
recession. If we designate –0.70 as our recession thresh-
old, we see that during the 1970, 1981–82, and 1990–
91 recessions, the index first fell below the threshold
during the first month of the recession. During the
1973–75 and 1980 recessions, the index first fell below
the –0.70 threshold during the third and second months
of the recessions, respectively. Thus, during the period
1967–2000, the CFNAI-MA3, using the –0.70 thresh-
old, gave a signal of the economy being in a recession
within the first three months of the recession.
The –0.70 recession threshold generated one false
alarm during the 1967–2000 period. Specifically, in
July 1989, the CFNAI-MA3 fell to –0.94, but no re-
cession materialized. One explanation for the signifi-
cant dip in the CFNAI-MA3 is that, from mid-1988
through spring 1989, the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee pursued a contractionary monetary policy in an
attempt to reduce inflation. This tight policy was re-
flected in an increase in the federal funds rate to 9.75
percent. During this time, the smoothed CFNAI exhib-
ited a steady decline, reaching its low level in July
1989, before returning above the –0.70 threshold.
This brief analysis highlights some problems
with using the CFNAI-MA3 and a simple threshold
rule to identify recessions. In particular, having a thresh-
old low enough to prevent false signals of recessions
will delay the date at which a true recession can be
identified. The threshold value of –0.70 identified all
five of the true recessions, but falsely signaled a sixth
recession. Using a lower recession threshold of –1.50
would have eliminated the false alarm, but the true
recessions would not have been identified until many
months into the recession. Indeed, the 1970 recession
would not have been identified until its twelfth
month—the last month of this recession.
Identifying historical recoveries
The tension between identifying turning points
early and minimizing the number of false signals also
arises when we try to determine when the economy
FIGURE 3
CFNAI-MA3 and business cycles
(1967–2001)











Note: Shaded areas indicate NBER recessions.31 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
has successfully pulled out of a recession. In this case,
we start with the rule that, when the CFNAI-MA3 first
crosses the +0.20 threshold level from below, the reces-
sion has ended; this threshold is indicated in figure 3
by the dashed positive horizontal line.
We see that, for four of the last five recessions,
the CFNAI-MA3 crossed +0.20 from below within
five months of the NBER-identified trough (official
end of the recession). Following the 1970 recession,
the smoothed index exceeded +0.20 two months after
the trough. For the 1973–75, 1980, and 1981–82 re-
cessions, the threshold was crossed in the fifth, third,
and fourth months, respectively, following the offi-
cial trough.
For the 1990–91 recession, however, the smoothed
CFNAI did not provide an early indication of the re-
cession’s end. Specifically, the CFNAI-MA3 crossed
+0.20 in November 1993, even though the trough was
retrospectively identified by the NBER as March 1991.
In part, high levels of corporate debt and financial in-
stitutions’ reduced ability to extend new financing
slowed the recovery from the 1990–91 recession. To
mitigate the effects of these financial headwinds, the
monetary policy response was to keep the federal funds
rate at 3 percent until February 1994. The CFNAI
signal was further delayed by the choppy nature of
the recovery. The halting movements of the activity
index, seen in figure 3, are consistent with contempo-
raneous economists’ accounts of double- and triple-
dips in economic activity during this period. Indeed,
this recovery was so difficult to discern that the NBER
only declared an end to this recession almost two
years after the trough had passed.
A more lax recovery threshold of +0.00, or return
to trend growth, would have identified the end of the
1990–91 recession earlier. Had this threshold been in
effect, the recovery would have been signaled in April
1992, or 19 months prior to the +0.20 threshold date.
On the other hand, the weaker recovery threshold
would also have generated false signals. In particular,
a +0.00 threshold would have prematurely (by 11
months) signaled the end of the 1973–74 recession.
Overall, then, the CFNAI-MA3 with a recovery
threshold of +0.20 was able to identify all of the re-
coveries, signaling four out of the five recoveries within
the first five months. Its identification of the erratic
1990–91 recovery, however, did not come until 32
months after the actual trough.
The CFNAI during the 2001 recession
Up until the 2001 recession, the evidence in favor
of using the CFNAI as a barometer for detecting the
onset of recessions was all historical. But with the
inaugural publication of the January 2001 CFNAI on
March 5, 2001, the evaluation process moved from
the sterile laboratory setting of a computer to a field
test using real-time data.
In the spring of 2000, the U.S. economy was con-
tinuing to expand at a rate that was above its potential
growth rate. Second-quarter real gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) growth was 5.7 percent. Monetary policy
had shifted to a relatively tight stance. The federal
funds rate began its initial increase in June 1999 from
4.75 percent to 6.50 percent in May 2000. By the sum-
mer of 2000, business analysts’ were expecting the
economy to begin a transition from above-trend growth
to a period of below-trend growth. Growth rates of
industrial production turned negative beginning in
July 2000, while other indicators began to cool notice-
ably. The January 2001 release of the CFNAI report-
ed that the CFNAI-MA3 had fallen below zero in July
2000. As zero represents the economy growing at trend,
the index captured the transition that business ana-
lysts in the press had been discussing.
Much of the initial drop in the CFNAI-MA3 comes
from industrial production and the ISM Purchasing
Managers Index data. These components provided
strongly negative weight to the other index components
that were more evenly spread around trend growth
behavior. Figure 4 displays category indexes represent-
ing each of the five data categories of the CFNAI from
1986 through 2001. The category indexes are construct-
ed by summing only the weighted series in each re-
spective category. Each category index is then re-scaled
to have a standard deviation of one. With this trans-
formation, if any of the category indexes captured all
of the movements of the CFNAI, the two would lie
on top of each other in figure 4.
The production/income (panel A), employment
(panel B), and inventory/orders (panel E) categories
track the initial decline in economic activity pretty
well for the second half of 2000. Manufacturing/trade
(panel D) captured some of this decline, while the con-
sumer (panel C) category did not fall below zero at
all in 2000. Once the recession began in March 2001,
according to the NBER business cycle dating com-
mittee, the categories began to diverge to a greater
extent. The production/income and inventory/orders
categories moved with the total CFNAI-MA3 during
this period. The employment category, however, fell
much more sharply, particularly beginning in March
2001. This latter observation is not surprising in the
context of the NBER’s announcements regarding the
selection of March 2001 as the most recent business
cycle peak. The dating committee mentioned that
movements in payroll employment were decisive in32 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
FIGURE 4
CFNAI category indexes—MA3 and business cycles (1967–2001)
A. Production and income
B. Employment, unemployment, and labor hours
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D. Manufacturing and trade sales



















Notes: Shaded areas indicate NBER recessions. The black
line indicates the CFNAI-MA3, and the colored line indicates
the respective category index.
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picking the date, and very important in the overall de-
termination that the economy had entered recession.
Within the full index, figure 4 displays some de-
gree of heterogeneity among the category indexes
during the recession of 2001. Manufacturing/trade fell
less than the overall index. And the consumer catego-
ry hardly registered any negative values. Simply us-
ing the consumer category as a proxy for the CFNAI
would clearly result in different inferences. The pro-
duction and employment categories move much more
strongly with the full index, although there are peri-
odic differences in magnitude.
Is there value in diversifying the basket
of economic indicators?
The previous discussion raises the issue: How
many indicators are necessary to provide an accurate
description of the state of economic activity? Does it
take a large number of economic indicators to filter










1967 ‘71 ‘75 ‘79 ‘83 ‘87 ‘91 ‘95 ‘99 ‘0233 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
indicator do the trick? Most analysts’ first approach
to answering this question would involve producing
large numbers of graphs and staring. Figure 5 (on
page 34) provides an abbreviated tour of the data.
Figure 5 displays graphs of several baskets of
economic indicators, as well as individual indicators.
Each panel graphs a three-month moving average of
the indicator against the CFNAI-MA3. We consider
two questions here: 1) How does the individual indi-
cator compare with the CFNAI-MA3?; and 2) How
well does the individual indicator perform at detect-
ing recessions and expansions using thresholds like
–0.70 and +0.20?
Are 85 real indicators enough? The CFNAI con-
tains only 85 indicators. Perhaps worse still, none of
these are financial indicators that have a proven track
record of periodically signaling turning points. An al-
ternative approach would construct an economic index
using a larger set of data that include financial, mon-
etary, and price variables. Figure 5, panel A displays
an analogous index employing 166 economic, finan-
cial, monetary, and price indicators. The striking fea-
ture of panel A is that the two measures are nearly
identical. Apparently, the first principal component
of this larger dataset is essentially an activity index.
This observation was originally made by Stock and
Watson (1999a).
Do we really need 85 indicators? In our earlier
analysis of the 2001 recession, we found that subcom-
ponents of the CFNAI performed reasonably well in
tracking the economic downturn. Perhaps a smaller
index performs just as well as the CFNAI. Figure 5,
panels B and C display the production and employ-
ment category indexes, respectively. The production
index follows the CFNAI-MA3 quite closely, and there
appear to be few differences in inference about busi-
ness cycle turning points. Both suffer from the false
recession signal in July 1989. The production index
has an additional false positive prior to the onset of
the 1980 recession. The CFNAI-MA3 was in nega-
tive territory in 1979 prior to the recession, but it did
not cross the –0.70 threshold until 1980. Following
the 1990–91 recession, the production index signals
the end of the recession much sooner than the full in-
dex. However, the slow expansion in 1991–92 makes
this virtue a bit hollow. In 1991, the production index
has a close brush with calling a second recession. The
CFNAI-MA3 moved lower in 1991 than the produc-
tion index; but since the index had not determined
the end of the recession, it would not be a second re-
cession. In both cases, the 1990–92 period is a diffi-
cult one. The employment component in figure 5,
panel C also performs reasonably well. On the plus
side, this component did not falsely signal a recession
in July 1989. On the downside, it did not capture the
1973–75 recession until late 1974, almost at its end.
In summary, smaller component indexes may perform
about as well as the CFNAI, but more experience is
required to sort this out.
Many individual indicators provide false signals.
As the focus narrows to individual economic indica-
tors, it is not surprising that many series provide false
readings on the state of the aggregate economy. The
discussion of the consumption and manufacturing/
trade categories of the CFNAI suggests that many of
these data are poor candidates by themselves. Figure
5, panels D, E, and F display real retail sales growth,
housing starts, and the PMI New Orders Index, re-
spectively. Each series has been transformed to be
mean zero and unit standard deviation and is a three-
month moving average. Retail sales growth is quite
volatile and often falls below the –0.70 threshold when
the economy is not in recession. Housing starts tend
to be low during most recessions. The slow recoveries
following the 1973–75 and 1990–91 recessions sug-
gest that this indicator does not provide a quick indi-
cation of economic recovery. In addition, there were
false recession warnings in 1967 and 1996; and the
2001 recession has been missed completely. Similarly,
the PMI New Orders Index captures the five reces-
sions prior to 2001, as well as the current one. How-
ever, there are several false warnings: 1967, 1996,
and 1998. Many single economic indicators contain
transient fluctuations that are not related to the state
of the economy.
Some individual indicators do pretty well. Be-
cause the CFNAI gives substantial weight to data on
industrial production and employment, it may be the
case that single indicators in this category provide
similar information to the CFNAI. Figure 5, panels
G and H display growth rates of industrial produc-
tion and private payroll employment. Similar to the
CFNAI category measures, these indicators do pretty
well. For both of them, recessions are periods when
industrial production and employment are low and
below –1.00. Using a recession threshold of –0.70 for
industrial production admits a couple of false reces-
sion warnings, but the performance improves if the
lower threshold is decreased further to –1.00. Em-
ployment seems to do better than industrial produc-
tion. This may be because the NBER has tended to
focus the recession determination on employment
data more than on industrial production, at least in
recent years.34 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
FIGURE 5
CFNAI-MA3 versus select economic indicators, three-month moving average (1967–2001)
A. Stock and Watson Index of 166 series
B. Production and Income Category Index
C. Employment, Unemployment, and Labor Hours Category Index
D. Real retail sales
F. PMI: Manufacturing New Orders Diffusion Index
G. Industrial production
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Summary of analysis
To sum up, our visual inspection of individual
data series suggests that the CFNAI-MA3 does not
perform appreciably better than the workhorse NBER
coincident economic indicators like industrial produc-
tion and private payroll employment. But an essential
question is: How much of this has been the result of
data-mining from the small number of recessions un-
der examination? The idiosyncratic statistical noise
in individual data series may have simply been small
enough over this period to make a couple of data series
work. In pooling 85 economic indicators for the CFNAI,
the method is purchasing an insurance policy against
statistical noise. And just like a home insurance poli-
cy, the mere fact that a house hasn’t burned down in
the ten years that it has been insured does not mean
that the insurance was unnecessary. To address this
issue over a longer period, we now turn to simulation
results of an empirically relevant statistical model.
Statistical approach and Monte Carlo
simulations
The preceding historical analysis provides only a
limited assessment of the CFNAI because the five-re-
cession sample during the 1967–2000 period is small
in statistical terms. For this reason, we have developed
and analyzed Monte Carlo simulations of a business
cycle index, 85 economic indicators, and the activity
index to assess patterns based on a larger number of
simulated observations.
The challenge is to estimate an empirically rele-
vant set of business cycles and 85 equations for the
economic indicators. For the business cycle indicator,
we adopt a nonlinear Markov-switching process de-
veloped by Hamilton (1989). This model states that
real activity transitions exogenously between expan-
sionary and contractionary rates of growth, while cap-
turing the historical average duration of business cycle
expansions and recessions. Diebold and Rudebusch
(1996) have also studied a system like this. For the
economic indicator equations, we follow the unob-
served component model studied by Stock and Watson
(1989). This specification states that each indicator is
related to the business cycle index but also is contami-
nated by independent statistical noise. This captures
the idea that each of the indicators has an idiosyncratic
component that is not related to aggregate activity.
Precise details on these specifications and the estima-
tion strategy are reported in the appendix.
Given estimates of our statistical model from
the 1967–2000 period, we conduct Monte Carlo sim-
ulations for the economy over a period of approximate-
ly 2,000 years. During this period, the nonlinear
Markov-switching model generates 404 recessions.
We can use the simulated data for the 85 economic
indicators to compute a CFNAI index over the 2,000-
year period. With these data, we can repeat the exer-
cise of using the CFNAI to decide if the economy
has entered a recession. Specifically, for any given
recession threshold of –r, we calculate whether the
CFNAI-MA3 indicates the economy is in recession.
The procedure works as follows.
1. Begin with the economy in an expansionary state.
2. If the CFNAI-MA3 falls below –r from above,
then the economy is in a “CFNAI recession.”
3. The CFNAI recession continues until the CFNAI-
MA3 rises above +0.20, and then the economy is
in a “CFNAI expansion.”
Repeating steps 1 through 3 until the data sample
is exhausted provides a long time-series of business
cycle dates according to the CFNAI-MA3 criterion.
The advantage of the laboratory environment is
that the experimental design allows us to know at any
date whether the true state of the simulated economy
is expansion or contraction. We can tabulate what per-
centage of the time a CFNAI recession is in fact a true
recession, and also what percentage of recessions are
missed by the CFNAI using a threshold of –r. For ex-
ample, using a threshold of –0.70, the CFNAI-MA3
criterion determined that 394 recessions occurred
during the 2,000 years of simulations. On the date
that the recession call occurred, the true state of the
business cycle was a recession in only 285 of the 394
recession calls. At this threshold, the frequency of
success in calling a recession was 72 percent. This
frequency can also be thought of as the probability
that a “recession call” is correct. Notice that 119 re-
cessions were missed (404 true recession minus 285
correct recessions). Therefore, the frequency of fail-
ing to call a recession was 29 percent when the thresh-
old criterion insisted that the moving average index
fall below –0.70.3 These are cases where the true econ-
omy was in recession, but the severity of the down-
turn was relatively modest.4
Before turning to the overall simulation results,
notice that we can also compute the success of other
indicators in calling recessions. We consider three
additional gauges. First, given the visual success of
the industrial production three-month moving index,
we have tabulated the success frequencies for a mea-
sure we call IP3. Second, given the visual failure for
consumption measures, we tabulated success frequen-
cies based upon a real personal consumption expen-
diture measure, referred to as CON3. Third, in order
to assess the overall accuracy of the CFNAI-MA336 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
measure, we tabulated a success frequency for an un-
observed measure of the business cycle that is com-
mon to all 85 economic indicators. By construction,
this measure has no indicator-specific idiosyncratic
noise. In some sense, this is a virtually ideal indicator
of the business cycle. We refer to this as ZSIM3, and
it corresponds to observing z directly (as defined in
the appendix).
Table 1 reports the simulation frequency results
for all four moving average indexes, using thresholds
from –0.70 to –2.20. Recall that during the 2,000-year
period of the exercise, the simulated business cycle
generates 404 “true” recessions.
First, consider the results for the CFNAI-MA3.
As we mentioned above, with a threshold of –0.70,
the probability that the economy has moved into re-
cession is 0.72. A practical application of this can be
seen from the March 2001 release of the CFNAI. As
reported on May 31, 2001, the March 2001 CFNAI-
MA3 was –0.80. According to the simulation results
here, that corresponds to approximately a 75 percent
probability that the economy was in recession. In fact,
the NBER reported in November that the economy
entered a recession in March, but the Business Cycle
Dating Committee also mentioned that without the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11, the economy might
not have gone into recession. Our calculations indi-
cate a relatively high likelihood, three out of four
chances, that the economy was in recession prior to
the terrorist attacks. Next, notice that as the threshold
for calling a recession becomes more stringent, the prob-
ability of making a false recession call becomes less
likely. The CFNAI releases during 2001 pointed out
that every economic recession since 1967 had breached
the –1.50 level, and most had declined much more.
The Monte Carlo simulations attach a 0.95 probability
to a threshold of –1.50, which seems consistent with
these observations. Not surprisingly, this increased
reliability comes at a higher cost. As the threshold
tightens, more true recessions are missed because they
are not sufficiently deep. Taken to an extreme, a very
large, negative threshold would likely guarantee that
recessions as deep as the Great Depression would be
captured, but perhaps at the cost of missing large re-
cessions such as 1973–75 or 1981–82.
The simulation results indicate that the CFNAI-
MA3 filters out almost all of the idiosyncratic noise
from the individual 85 economic indicators. Specifi-
cally, if the aggregate indicator z were directly ob-
servable, then the ZSIM3 measure could be constructed.
At a threshold of –0.70, whenever ZSIM3 crossed
this threshold, there would be a 74 percent probabili-
ty that the economy was in recession, compared with
the CFNAI-MA3 probability of 72 percent. Across
the range of thresholds considered, these differences
are essentially negligible.
Looking at the performance of IP3, however,
the differences appear to be more substantial at first
TABLE 1
Simulation frequency results for all four moving average indexes
Probability that recession call is correct Probability that recession is missed
Threshold ZSIM3 CFNAI–MA3 IP3 CON3 ZSIM3 CFNAI–MA3 IP3 CON3
–0.70 0.74 0.72 0.51 0.35 0.27 0.29 0.23 0.26
–0.80 0.78 0.76 0.58 0.38 0.27 0.30 0.25 0.37
–0.90 0.83 0.81 0.67 0.44 0.27 0.30 0.25 0.48
–1.00 0.86 0.85 0.70 0.46 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.57
–1.10 0.89 0.88 0.73 0.55 0.30 0.30 0.34 0.67
–1.20 0.92 0.92 0.77 0.57 0.33 0.33 0.39 0.77
–1.30 0.93 0.94 0.81 0.57 0.37 0.36 0.45 0.85
–1.40 0.94 0.94 0.84 0.57 0.40 0.40 0.53 0.90
–1.50 0.96 0.95 0.89 0.65 0.43 0.45 0.57 0.93
–1.60 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.70 0.49 0.50 0.65 0.96
–1.70 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.67 0.56 0.54 0.71 0.98
–1.80 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.78 0.99
–1.90 0.99 0.99 0.99 N/A 0.66 0.65 0.83 N/A
–2.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 N/A 0.72 0.71 0.87 N/A
–2.10 0.99 0.99 0.97 N/A 0.78 0.76 0.92 N/A
–2.20 0.99 0.99 0.96 N/A 0.81 0.80 0.94 N/A
Note: N/A indicates not applicable.37 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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glance. At a threshold of –0.70, the IP3
measure has a recession success proba-
bility of only 51 percent. However, in-
dustrial production exhibits deeper
reductions during recessions, so a lower
threshold may be more accurate. In fact,
at –1.00, the IP3 success rate is 70 per-
cent, with only a missed probability of
29 percent. This is essentially the same
performance as the CFNAI-MA3 at the
–0.70 threshold.
A cleaner comparison of these per-
formances is to graph the probability
trade-offs for each indicator on the same
graph. For each indicators’ threshold, fig-
ure 6 plots a pair of probabilities: the prob-
ability that “a recession was called” when
no recession occurred versus the proba-
bility that “a recession occurred” but
wasn’t called. The most efficient indica-
tors will minimize both of these proba-
bilities and exhibit a probability frontier,
which is concentrated in the southwest
portion of the figure.
Figure 6 clearly displays two useful properties of
the CFNAI-MA3 as a business cycle indicator. First,
the performance of CFNAI-MA3 closely follows the
performance of the unobservable index ZSIM3. By
using the CFNAI to filter out idiosyncratic noise in
the 85 economic indicators, we lose little by not ob-
serving the z indicator. Second, the IP3 indicator only
performs better than the CFNAI-MA3 at levels of
false positives that most analysts would deem unac-
ceptable. As long as the probability of successfully
calling a recession exceeds 65 percent, the CFNAI-
MA3 and ZSIM3 provide lower rates of failing to
call a recession than the IP3 index. Finally, focusing
on consumption indicators alone is unlikely to pro-
vide useful indicators of business cycle turning points.
The CON3 frontier is dominated by the other indica-
tors for all reasonable probabilities. This is not really
surprising, considering that household spending indi-
cators do not always turn down dramatically during
recessions. During the 2001 recession, which is not
included in the simulated business cycle analysis here,
the economy continued to experience strong growth
in consumer spending during much of the downturn.
Conclusion
The Chicago Fed National Activity Index was
launched on March 5, 2001, and was promptly tested
by the deceleration of U.S. economic growth that be-
gan in the summer of 2000. Throughout this period,
the CFNAI release discussed how the low index val-
ues below –0.70 had previously been associated with
economic recessions, and each successive month in
2001 was showing an increasing probability that the
economy was already in recession. The NBER later
declared that the economy officially entered recession
in March 2001. The statistical analysis presented in
this article indicates that the March 2001 CFNAI-MA3
of –0.80 was associated with a 75 percent probability
that the economy was in recession at that time. The
March CFNAI was released on May 2, 2001, com-
pared with the NBER report in November 2001. Con-
sequently, the real-time experience with the index
and the statistical analysis here seem consistent with
the view that the Chicago Fed National Activity In-
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APPENDIX: MONTE CARLO SIMULATION METHODS
The Monte Carlo simulation consists of four parts. First,
we specify two models: a model of the business cycle
index and a model of the relationship between the (un-
observed) business cycle index and the observable parts
of the economy. Second, we estimate the parameters re-
quired for the models using data from historical indica-
tors. Third, using the estimated parameters, we simulate
the unobservable business cycle index and the 85 observ-
able series. Finally, we compute the simulated CFNAI
index as a weighted average of these 85 simulated series,
and we evaluate the ability of the activity index to sig-
nal turning points in the simulated business cycle index.
Model of the business cycle and
observable series
Heuristically, a single index of the business cycle
indicates whether the aggregate economy is expanding
or contracting. Because of the complexities of large,
dynamic, and decentralized economies, individual eco-
nomic indicators will be correlated with this latent in-
dex of the business cycle, but are measured with
idiosyncratic noise.
We use the Hamilton regime-switching model
(Hamilton, 1989, and Diebold and Rudebusch, 1996)
to formalize the behavior of the business cycle index.
In particular, we express unobservable real activity as:
1) zt = µexp + µrecessSt + z ˜ t ,
where
zt is the (unobservable) growth in economic
activity;
µexp is the growth of economic activity during
expansions;
µrecess + µexp is the growth of economic activity
during recessions;
St ∈{0,1} is the binary random variable identifying
the state/regime, where St = 0 designates an
expansion and St = 1 designates a recession, and
the switching between expansion and recession
states is determined by Markov transition probabil-
ities; and
z ˜t is a noise term that follows an AR(1) process,
namely
2) z ˜t = ϕz ˜t-1 + vt,
where
2 ~( 0 ,) , tv vNσ is independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.). z ˜t is a deviation of current
growth from trend growth, which is independent
of the business cycle state S.
In this way, latent economic activity is modeled as
a non-linear process with cyclical noise.
We model the observable variables x to be noisy
measures of zt. In particular, we specify that each of the
85 observable variables is determined by:
3) , =γ + it i t it xz u
where
xit is the observable indicator, where 1 ≤ i ≤8 5 ,   and
uit is a noise term that follows an AR(1) process:
4)  uit = diuit–1 + εit , where εit ~ N(0, ) 
2
i ε σ is i.i.d.
Similar specifications have been studied in many
aggregate time series studies; see Stock and Watson
(1989) for an extended example and additional refer-
ences. Combining equations 1 and 3, we have:
exp 5) ( ) , it i recess t it xS w =γ µ +µ +
where
1See NBER (2001).
2More specifically, the NBER recession periods were December
1969–November 1970, November 1973–March 1975, January
1980–July 1980, July 1981–November 1982, and July 1990–
March 1991. According to the NBER definition of contraction
(recession), the first date of each recession period indicates the
peak of a business cycle, and the second date indicates the subse-
quent trough of the cycle.
3Notice that given knowledge of the total number of true recessions,
404, the two percentages are sufficient to recover the number of
“recessions called,” “correctly called recessions,” and “recessions
not called.”
4The Monte Carlo simulations of the Hamilton–Markov switching
process include a restriction that recessions and expansions can
be no shorter than six months. The stochastic process described
in the appendix has the property that the economy could shift to
recession for a single month. Although this is not likely, short re-
cessions do occur over a 2,000-year simulation. In the simula-
tions, if the economy shifted from one state to another before six
months had elapsed, we assumed that the shift happened at the
six-month mark. This had no noticeable effect on the average du-
ration of recessions in the simulations.
NOTES39 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
6) wit = γi   z ˜t + uit.
It is important to recognize that S, z ˜, and u are mu-
tually independent. Similar assumptions are typically
employed in the empirical literature, as in Hamilton
(1989), Diebold and Rudebusch (1996), and Stock and
Watson (1989).
Estimation of parameters
To provide empirically interesting simulation ex-
periments, we need estimates of the model parameters
µexp, µrecess, the Markov transition probabilities, ϕ, 
2
v σ ,
γi, di, and 
2
v σ for each indicator xi.
We estimate µexp and µrecess from the growth rates of
real GDP from 1947 to 2000. Specifically, we compute
the growth rate of real GDP during each expansionary
period and each recessionary period (as identified by the
NBER). We then set the parameter µexp equal to the aver-
age GDP growth rate over all expansions, and µrecess +
µexp  equal to the average growth rate over all recessions.
Table A1 lists the estimated values of these parameters.
The transition probabilities are calibrated so that
they correspond to the average length of historical
expansions and recessions. In particular, we use the re-
lations that the duration of an expansion = 1/(1 – proba-
bility of remaining in an expansion), and the duration
of a recession = 1/(1– probability of remaining in a
recession). That is, the mean duration of an expansion
=  1 1/(1 Pr{ 0| 0}), tt SS − −= =  and the mean duration of
a recession =  1 1/(1 Pr{ 1| 1}). tt SS − −==  Based upon
the NBER business cycle dates for 1947–2000, the
mean duration of an expansion has been 50 months and
the mean duration of a recession has been 12 months.
The transition probabilities based on these calculations
are also shown in table A1.
To find estimates of γi, we regress each of the 85
actual indicators on  exp ˆˆ µ+ µ recess t S for the period 1967–
2000, where S is the binary variable indicating expan-
sionary and recessionary periods. This regression is
well specified, given the independence of S, ! z,  and  u.
For values of S, we note that Hamilton (1989) finds that
his Kalman-smoothed inferences of the latent business
cycle index correspond reasonably closely with the
NBER business cycle dates. Let S = 0 during expansion
TABLE A1
Estimated business cycle parameters
months and S = 1 during recession months.1 According
to equation 5, this regression gives us  ˆ γ i and  ˆ i w for
each of the i indicators.
To estimate the remaining parameters, we make an
additional assumption that allows us to use a simple
method of moments estimator. The additional assump-
tion is that there are two “instrument” indicators that
reflect the business cycle to the same degree. Specifi-
cally, let x1 and x2 be as follows:
11 11 e x p 1 7) ( ) , =γ + =γ µ +µ + t t t recess t t xz u S w
and
22 22 e x p 2 8) ( ) , =γ + =γ µ +µ + t t t recess t t xz u S w
with the restriction that
9) γ1 = γ2 = γ.
As noted earlier, the disturbance terms w1 and w2
are independently distributed. This restriction is most
likely to be satisfied when two indicators attempt to
measure the same economic phenomenon but are from
different source data. An example of this is in Prescott
(1986), when he proposes a probability model of mea-
sured employment hours based upon the establishment
survey and the household survey. Another example is
where the two indicators have a similar relationship to
the business cycle index, but are measured with differ-
ent levels of precision. For example, equation 9 might
hold even when one indicator was a measure of output
and another was a measure of input. In any event, the
two instrument indicators used in this study are Private
Payroll Employment growth from the BLS and the In-
stitute for Supply Management’s Purchasing Managers
Index of New Orders. The source data for these two se-
ries are clearly independent. In addition, the restriction
in equation 9 is not rejected by the parameter estimates
for these two indicators.
We use the restriction in equation 9 to estimate
ϕ and 
2, σv  and (for each indicator) di and 
2 . ε σ
i  Using








it t it t ww uu
To find an estimate of di, we use equations 4, 6,
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Because we have estimates of γi and wi, we can use
equation 13 to find  ˆ . i d
To find estimates of 
2 , ε σ
i we note that equation 4
implies the following relationship between the varianc-
es of εi and ui:
22 2 14) (1 ) . ε σ= − σ
ii i u d
Since 
2 σ
i u can be estimated using equation 11,
we can easily obtain estimates of 
2
ε σ
i  using equation
14. Similarly, we obtain an estimate of ϕ by noting that
equations 2 and 6 imply:
[ ]
22
12 15) =γσ ! tt z Eww
and
22
12 1 16) [ ] . − =γϕ σ ! tt z Eww
TABLE A2
Estimated parameters of selected indicator equations





PMI, new orders 0.282 0.715 0.399 0.673
Employment, private 0.272 0.297 0.578 0.636
Employment, nonagriculture 0.268 –0.244 0.601 0.619
Employment, goods industry 0.278 –0.190 0.566 0.670
Unemployment rate –0.232 –0.436 0.686 0.426
Help-wanted ads 0.197 –0.431 0.731 0.341
PMI, production 0.288 0.724 0.372 0.709
Industrial production 0.229 –0.184 0.725 0.458
IP , manufacturing 0.236 –0.243 0.701 0.479
Capacity utilization, manufacturing 0.221 –0.195 0.726 0.451
Personal income, transfers 0.197 –0.128 0.837 0.296
Housing permits 0.256 0.915 0.273 0.542
Housing starts, Midwest 0.213 0.765 0.500 0.403
Housing starts, West 0.253 0.839 0.383 0.494
Manufacturing and trade sales 0.153 –0.392 0.841 0.169
Retail sales (real) 0.081 –0.271 0.949 0.036
Personal consumption expenditures 0.092 –0.312 0.930 0.050
New orders, construction, and materials 0.130 –0.250 0.909 0.128
Manufacturing and trade, inventory/sales –0.117 –0.238 0.933 0.083
Note: The variables being measured in this table are derived from equation 3—xit = γizt+uit—and equation 4—uit=diuit-1+ εit—where ε εσ
2 ~( 0 , ) .
i it N
1NBER recessions are designated from peak to trough. For these
exercises, we consider the peak and trough months as part of the
recession period.
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18) (1 ) , where [ ]. σ= − ϕσ σ=
γ
!! vz z t t Eww
Finally, in estimating parameters for a particular
xit, the choice of instrument indicator (x2t) will depend
on whether xit is from the ISM data release or not. For
example, if xit corresponds to a component of the Pur-
chasing Managers Index, then x2t will be payroll employ-
ment; otherwise, it will be the PMI New Orders Index.
Table A2 presents a partial listing of the indicator param-
eter estimates. Table A3 lists all of the component data
series in the CFNAI.41 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE A3
CFNAI component data series
Production and income (21 series)
CUMFG DLV Capacity utilization: Manufacturing SA, percent of capacity
IP DLN Industrial Production Index SA, 1992=100
IP51 DLN Industrial Production: Consumer goods SA, 1992=100
IP5102 DLN Industrial Production: Durable consumer goods SA, 1992=100
IP51021 DLN Industrial Production: Nondurable consumer goods SA, 1992=100
IP52001 DLN Industrial Production: Business equipment SA, 1992=100
IP53 DLN Industrial Production: Materials SA, 1992=100
IP53011 DLN Industrial Production: Materials: Durable SA, 1992=100
IP53017 DLN Industrial Production: Materials: Nondurable SA, 1992=100
IP54 DLN Industrial Production: Intermediate products SA, 1992=100
IPDG DLN Industrial Production: Durable manufacturing SA, 1992=100
IPFP DLN Industrial Production: Final products SA, 1992=100
IPMFG DLN Industrial Production: Manufacturing SA, 1992=100
IPMIN DLN Industrial Production: Mining SA, 1992=100
IPND DLN Industrial Production: Nondurable manufacturing SA, 1992=100
IPTP DLN Industrial Production: Products SA, 1992=100
IPUTI DLN Industrial Production: Utilities SA, 1992=100
NAPMC LV Institute for Supply Management: Manufacturing: Composite Index SA, percent
NAPMOI LV Institute for Supply Management: Manufacturing: Diffusion Index, Production SA, percent
YPDHM DLN Disposable personal income SAAR, billions of chained 1996$
YPLTPMH DLN Real personal income less transfer payments SAAR, billions of chained 1996$
Employment, unemployment and labor hours (24 series)
A0M005 DLV Weekly initial claims for unemployment insurance SA, thousands
LACONSA DLN All employees: Construction SA, thousands
LADURGA DLN All employees: Durable goods manufacturing SA, thousands
LAFIREA DLN All employees: Finance, insurance, and real estate SA, thousands
LAGOODA DLN All employees: Goods-producing industries SA, thousands
LAGOVTA DLN All employees: Government SA, thousands
LAMANUA DLN All employees: Manufacturing SA, thousands
LAMINGA DLN All employees: Mining SA, thousands
LANAGRA DLN Employees on nonfarm payrolls SA, thousands
LANDURA DLN All employees: Nondurable goods manufacturing SA, thousands
LAPRIVA DLN All employees: Private nonfarm payrolls SA, thousands
LARTRDA+LAWTRDA DLN All employees: Retail and wholesale trade SA, thousands
LASERPA DLN All employees: Service-producing industries SA, thousands
LASRVSA DLN All employees: Services SA, thousands
LATPUTA DLN All employees: Transportation and public utilities SA, thousands
LE DLN Civilian employment: Sixteen years & over SA, thousands
LENA DLN Civilian employment: Nonagricultural industries SA, thousands
LHELP DLN Index of help-wanted advertising in newspapers SA, 1987=100
LHELPR DLN Ratio: Help-wanted advertising in newspapers/number unemployed SA
LOMANUA DLV Average weekly overtime hours: Manufacturing SA, hours
LR DLV Civilian unemployment rate SA, percent
LRM25 DLV Civilian unemployment rate: Men, 25–54 years SA, percent
LRMANUA DLV Average weekly hours: Manufacturing SA, hours
NAPMEI LV Institute for Supply Management: Manufacturing: Diffusion Index, Employment SA, percent
Personal consumption and housing (13 series)
CBHM DLN Personal consumption expenditures SAAR, billions of chained 1996$
CDBHM DLN Personal consumption expenditures: Durable goods SAAR, billions of chained 1996$
CDMNHM DLN Personal consumption expenditures: New autos SAAR, millions of chained 1996$
CNBHM DLN Personal consumption expenditures: Nondurable goods SAAR, billions of chained 1996$
CONDO9 LN Construction contracts, millions of square feet
CSBHM DLN Personal consumption expenditures: Services SAAR, billions of chained 1996$
HPT LN Housing units authorized by building permit SAAR, thousands of units
HSM LN Manufacturers’ shipment of mobile homes SAAR, thousands of units
HST LN Housing starts SAAR, thousands of units
HSTMW LN Housing starts: Midwest SAAR, thousands of units
HSTNE LN Housing starts: Northeast SAAR, thousands of units
HSTS LN Housing starts: South SAAR, thousands of units
HSTW LN Housing starts: West SAAR, thousands of units42 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
TABLE A3 (CONTINUED)
CFNAI component data series
Manufacturing and trade sales (11 series)
NAPMVDI LV Institute for Supply Management: Manufacturing: Diffusion Index, Vendor Deliveries SA, percent
RSDH DLN Real retail sales: Durable goods SA, millions of chained 1996$
RSH DLN Real retail sales SA, millions of chained 1996$
RSNH DLN Real retail sales: Nondurable goods SA, millions of chained 1996$
TSMDH DLN Sales: Manufacturing: Durable Goods SA, millions of chained 1996$
TSMH DLN Sales: Manufacturing SA, millions of chained 1996$
TSMNH DLN Sales: Manufacturing: Nondurable goods SA, millions of chained 1996$
TSTH DLN Real manufacturing and trade: Sales SA, millions of chained 1996$
TSWDH DLN Sales: Wholesale: Durable goods SA, millions of chained 1996$
TSWH DLN Sales: Merchant wholesalers SA, millions of chained 1996$
TSWNH DLN Sales: Wholesale: Nondurable goods SA, millions of chained 1996$
Inventories and orders (16 series)
A0M007 DLN Real manufacturers’ new orders: Durable goods industries, billions of chained 1996$
A0M008 DLN Real manufacturers’ new orders: Consumer goods & materials SA, millions of 1996$
A0M020 DLN Contracts and orders for plant and equipment, billions of chained 1996$
A0M027 DLN Real manufacturers’ new orders: Nondefense capital goods industries SA, millions of 1996$
NAPMII LV Institute for Supply Management: Manufacturing: Diffusion Index, Inventory SA, percent
NAPMNI LV Institute for Supply Management: Manufacturing: Diffusion Index, New orders SA, percent
TIMDH DLN Inventories: Manufacturing: Durable goods EOP , SA, millions of chained 1996$
TIMH DLN Inventories: Manufacturing EOP , SA, millions of chained 1996$
TIMNH DLN Inventories: Manufacturing: Nondurable goods EOP , SA, millions of chained 1996$
TIRH DLN Inventories: Retail trade EOP , SA, millions of chained 1996$
TITH DLN Real manufacturing & trade inventories EOP , SA, millions of chained 1996$
TIWH DLN Inventories: Merchant wholesalers EOP , SA, millions of chained 1996$
TRMH DLV Inventory/sales ratio: Manufacturing SA, chained 1996$
TRRH DLV Inventory/sales ratio: Retail trade SA, chained 1996$
TRTH DLV Real manufacturing and trade: Inventory/sales ratio SA, chained 1996$
TRWH DLV Inventory/sales ratio: Merchant wholesalers SA, chained 1996$
Notes: The variable mnemonics are those from HaverAnalytics. For a series yt, the stationary transformations are as follows: LV: xt = yt; DLV:
xt = yt – yt–1; LN: xt = ln(yt); and DLN: xt = ln(yt) – ln(yt–1). SA is seasonally adjusted. SAAR is seasonally adjusted annual rate. EOP is end
of period.43 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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